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Summary: Henri Lefebvre famously seized upon the duality of the modern city:
how for some it is a space of play and liberation, and for others a centre for power
and repression. This article explores this duality through an analysis of the changing
historical geography of Barcelona’s Raval district, an inner-city working-class
community and the birthplace of Catalan industrialization. From the 1920s
onwards, elite groups and social commentators defined the Raval as Barcelona’s
‘‘Chinatown’’, an imagined geography that continues to influence historical
representations of the area. Through a social history of the Raval, it is argued that
the ‘‘Chinatown’’ myth served specific political ends, that it formed part of a cultural
project to impose a slum myth on Barcelona’s most important and most rebellious
working class district. The article concludes with an analysis of how this ‘‘moral
geography’’ culminated in far-reaching plans for the moral and physical reordering
of the Raval for the benefit of urban elites.
‘‘Ah Barcelona, if you had any shame not a single house would remain standing
[in ‘Chinatown’].’’
Rafael Nogueras i Oller, El Carrer del Migdia. Oda nu´mero 2 a Barcelona
‘‘[:::] the democratic character of a regime is identifiable by its attitude towards
the city, urban ‘liberties’ and urban reality, and therefore towards segregation’’.
Henri Lefebvre
I N T R O D U C T I O N
Henri Lefebvre famously seized upon the duality of the modern city: how
for some it is a space of opportunity, play, and liberation, while for others
 My interest in the study began during the two-year period when I lived in Barcelona as a
doctoral student. For some of this time I resided in the Raval, where I witnessed the beginnings
of ‘‘gentrification’’ ahead of the 1992 Olympic Games. In subsequent trips to Barcelona, I
discovered that growing numbers of my favourite haunts in the Raval had disappeared under the
pencils of the city planners and the bulldozers of the construction companies. I’m grateful to
Helen Graham for her comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
IRSH 50 (2005), pp. 373–397 DOI: 10.1017/S0020859005002154
# 2005 Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis
it is a centre for power, control, and repression.1 This article explores this
duality through an analysis of the changing historical geography of
Barcelona’s Raval district, an inner-city working-class community and the
birthplace of the Catalan industrial revolution.
For Barcelona, the decades that followed the 1830s were a period of
vertiginous expansion of urban-industrial space which meant that by 1930
the Catalan capital was the only Spanish city to boast a population of 1
million. In this unplanned and unregulated urbanization process, new
districts appeared almost overnight, conjured up by property speculators
and landlords. From the mid-1920s onwards, a range of social commenta-
tors – journalists, physicians, historians,2 local authorities, business
groups, and reformist trade-union leaders – began talking about a new
part of the city – ‘‘Chinatown’’ (Barrio Chino). Yet Chinatown was an
imagined geography, something that was graphically underlined by the
fact that, unlike the other ‘‘Chinatowns’’ in London and North America,
there were no Chinese immigrants in Barcelona’s Chinatown. Rather,
Chinatown discourse was a slum myth propagated by a series of social
elites who were increasingly concerned about the threat posed by the
inner-city area to their vision of urban governance. The slum and
‘‘underworld’’ myth of Chinatown continues to influence historical and
spatial representations today,3 and highlights the tendency among many
academic specialists to view working-class districts as inherently chaotic
and disorganized.4
The first part of this article will explore the origins and development of
Chinatown as a social and cultural construct and how it was imposed on
the Raval. I will then go on to discuss the social and political history of the
Raval, in particular its importance as a centre of social protest and
1. Henri Lefebvre, La production de l’espace (Paris, 1974; [The Production of Space, Oxford,
1991]). For an exploration of this process in relation to Barcelona, see Chris Ealham, Class,
Culture and Conflict in Barcelona, 1898–1937 (London, 2005), esp. chs 1 and 2.
2. In the 1950s, the Francoist historian, Eduardo Comı´n Colomer, described the area as
‘‘intricate and always mysterious’’; Historia del anarquismo espan˜ol, 2 vols (Barcelona, 1956), vol.
2, p. 134. For a brief history of the area, see Gary Wray McDonogh, ‘‘The Geography of Evil:
Barcelona’s Barrio Chino’’, Anthropological Quarterly, 60:4, pp. 174–184.
3. See, for instance, Enric Ucelay da Ucelay and Dorsey Boatwright, ‘‘La dona del ‘Barrio
Chino’. La imatge dels baixos fons i la revista ‘El Esca´ndalo’’’, L’Avenc¸, 76 (1984), pp. 26–34;
Donald McNeill, Urban Change and the European Left: Tales from the New Barcelona
(London, 1999), pp. 25, 31; Maria Ama`lia Pradas, ‘‘Pistoles i pistolers. El mapa de la viole`ncia a la
Barcelona dels anys 1920’’, L’Avenc¸, 285 (2003), pp. 13–20.
4. This view can be traced to the Chicago School of ‘‘urban sociology’’; see, for example, Robert
Park et al., The City: Suggestions for Investigation of Human Behaviour in the Urban
Environment (Chicago, IL, 1925). Belying their radical veneer, postmodern perspectives lend
strength to this trend. According to Jordana Mendelson, Chinatown ‘‘corresponds to Michel
Foucault’s concept of ‘heterotopy’, a disordered, abnormal space’’; Jordana Mendelson, ‘‘Una
tarde en Barcelona’’, in idem and Juan Jose´ Lahuerta (eds), Margaret Michaelis: Fotografı´a,
vanguardia y polı´tica en la Barcelona de la Repu´blica (Barcelona, 1998), p. 37.
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contestation. And finally I will assess the historic significance of China-
town discourse as a ‘‘moral geography’’,5 or a ‘‘geography of fear’’, that
tells us a great deal about the consciousness of urban elites in a given space
at a given time.6 Therefore, while Barcelona’s Chinatown may have been
an invented space, with an imaginary geography and history, for the urban
elites it was all too real: it was a landscape of disorder and terror.7 Thus, we
will see that this exclusionary Chinatown discourse had specific political
uses: its topophobic obsessions justified official projects for ‘‘cleansing’’
the Raval’s ‘‘diseased’’ streets, which were to be placed under new
surveillance and restructured, both physically and morally.
T H E O R I G I N S O F T H E C H I N A T O W N L E G E N D
The term was first coined in 1925 by Paco Madrid, a young journalist on El
Esca´ndalo (‘‘The Scandal’’), an ephemeral Barcelona weekly newspaper
that was briefly resurrected in 1933 as ¡Esca´ndolo! (‘‘Scandal!’’).8 Madrid
had seen a film about San Francisco’s Chinatown, and decided that it was
an appropriate label for the Raval neighbourhood.9 For Madrid, China-
town was ‘‘the city’s ulcer [:::] the refuge of bad people’’, and the
‘‘underworld’’ (bajos fondos), a ‘‘forbidden zone far worse that anything in
Marseilles, Genoa or the East End of London’’.10
Such themes were developed avidly by Madrid’s journalist colleagues in
El Esca´ndalo, Chinatown being described successively as ‘‘the district of
sinners, crooks and toughs’’, a ‘‘maggot hill’’, a ‘‘cesspit and cavern, a den of
criminals’’, and other ‘‘social detritus’’.11 Chinatown was fetishized,
endowed with causal powers, apparently destroying all moral and physical
life within it. It was ‘‘a terrible centre for infection’’, ‘‘the pestulant bottom
of a sewer’’, with ‘‘its smell of sin and affliction’’.12 Many of the area’s
5. According to Felix Driver, the significance of this ‘‘moral geography’’ is that it ‘‘unite[s]
[other] discourses on morality, health and space’’; Felix Driver, ‘‘Moral Geographies: Social
Science and the Urban Environment in Mid-Nineteenth Century England’’, Transactions:
Institute of British Geographers, 13 (1988), pp. 275–287. For a more detailed study, see Ruth
Harris, Murders and Madness: Medicine, Law and Society in the Fin de Sie`cle (New York, 1989).
6. James Kneale, ‘‘‘A Problem of Supervision’: Moral Geographies of the Nineteenth-Century
British Public House’’, Journal of Historical Geography, 25 (1999), pp. 333–348.
7. See Chris Ealham, ‘‘Class and the City: Spatial Memories of Pleasure and Danger in
Barcelona, 1914–23’’, Oral History, 29 (2001), pp. 33–47.
8. El Esca´ndolo, 22 October 1925. Paco Madrid also wrote a book on the area, with the
sensational title ‘‘Blood in Atarazanas’’: Sangre en Atarazanas (Barcelona, 1926).
9. Paco Madrid’s writings reflected the fact that the big US city was, by the 1920s, increasingly
the chronotype for urban growth in Barcelona, where the growing influence of the North
American way of life was reflected in the craving for Hollywood movies, North American
music, dress, and drinks.
10. El Esca´ndolo, 22 October 1925; Madrid, Sangre en Atarazanas, p. 9.
11. El Esca´ndolo, 13 and 20 May, 15 July 1926.
12. El Esca´ndolo, 13 and 20 May 1926.
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inhabitants had mutated into a subhuman race. One intrepid El Esca´ndalo
reporter ventured into a Chinatown bar and described its clientele thus:
‘‘Everyone has funereal features, the look of having recently been in
hospital, the appearance of death [:::]. They don’t eat. They nourish
themselves with alcohol, morphine, ether, ‘coke’ and wine.’’13
These motifs were taken up by the popular press in a stream of
sensationalist and frequently prurient newspaper articles that was
consumed voraciously by a largely disapproving but highly curious
middle-class readership.14 Very quickly, the term, Chinatown, entered
into everyday usage in the city, becoming synonymous with immorality
and crime. Chinatown was portrayed as an alien space: it was the ‘‘product
of exportation’’ with ‘‘very little local character’’,15 which defied the mores
and civic spirit that prevailed in the rest of the city: it ‘‘stains the good name
of Barcelona’’,16 ‘‘it is impossible to understand how anyone can live
there’’.17 Perhaps surprisingly, this discourse also found an echo among
left-wing groups, in particular, social-democratic groups, whose stress on
working-class respectability made them receptive to warnings about the
dangers of the ‘‘underworld’’ in Chinatown.18 Chinatown discourse even
resonated within some anarchist circles.19
It is all too easy to dismiss Chinatown moral panics, with their highly
ideological content and their hysterical tone. Certainly, this discourse,
described by one commentator as a ‘‘distorting mirror’’ lacks sociological
validity.20 Moreover, by focusing exclusively on moral categories, China-
town discourse ignored material factors and the central role played by the
Raval in Barcelona’s economic and historical geography.21
13. El Esca´ndolo, 7 and 14 October 1926.
14. See headlines such as ‘‘Panic in Chinatown’’ and ‘‘Cocaine! The Secrets of the Drug’’, in
¡Esca´ndalo!, 5 September 1933; see also articles in L’Opinio´, 26 March, 22 September 1933; La
Publicitat, 16 August 1933, 11, 18 April 1934; La Vanguardia, 26 April 1934, 10 November 1935.
These images were also propagated through novels, such as Dome`nec de Bellmunt, L’Angel
Bohemi (Barcelona, 1935), and urban travelogues, such as idem, Les Catacumbes de Barcelona
(Barcelona, 1930), especially pp. 73–82, and Josep Maria Planes, Nits de Barcelona (Barcelona,
1931).
15. ¡Esca´ndalo!, 5 September 1933.
16. Guillermo Lo´pez, Barcelona sucia. Artı´culos de malas costumbres (Barcelona, n.d.), p. 24.
17. El Esca´ndolo, 20 May 1926.
18. See, for instance, Justicia Social, 1 August 1931 and 29 April 1933.
19. Solidaridad Obrera, 30 May 1931 referred to the area as a ‘‘place of public, moral and
material decomposition [pudridero]’’, and of ‘‘degeneration and crime’’, in which ‘‘the shameless
pimp, the drunk and the crook are the masters of these streets’’. It should be noted that the
‘‘moral panics’’ of the anarchists were of a different nature to those of the elites, and centred on
the fear that the danger posed by the ‘‘bourgeois vices’’ offered in the Raval’s brothels and taverns
might corrode working-class revolutionary energies. See also Tierra y Libertad, 5 December
1931.
20. Susanna Barrows, Distorting Mirrors: Visions of the Crowd in Late Nineteenth-Century
France (New Haven, CT, 1981).
21. Front, 30 July 1932.
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A ‘‘ N U R S E R Y F O R R E V O L U T I O N A R I E S ’’ : A S O C I A L A N D
P O L I T I C A L H I S T O R Y O F T H E R A V A L
The Raval’s historical geography was inextricably linked with Barcelona’s
urban-capitalist development. Indeed, more than any other of Barcelona’s
districts, the changing rhythms and vicissitudes of the industrialization
process were deeply embedded within the Raval. From the 1830s onwards,
the Raval was transformed by Barcelona’s first wave of industrialization
into the birthplace of the local working class and of the labour movement.
As was the case throughout Europe, in this initial phase of industrializa-
tion, workers lived and laboured in the same space, generally inhabiting
hastily constructed and densely packed tenement blocks close to their
workplaces.
The Raval’s urban form was initially conditioned by the determination
of the central state to limit Barcelona’s urban growth to the area inside its
medieval walls, which saw the unregulated and unplanned urbanization of
an area of fewer than 2.5 square kilometres. By 1860, when the Madrid
authorities permitted the economic and social forces accumulated within
the old city to spill out beyond its walls, the Raval consisted of a randomly
arranged web of compact and heavily populated narrow streets and alleys
crammed in around the district’s factories, workshops, and warehouses,
ending at the Barcelona waterfront. Working-class housing and living
conditions in the area were already miserable. The typical Raval tenement
was four to six stories high, with one family occupying each floor. Each
block had a single toilet and a water tap on the ground floor which was
shared by all occupants. Such was the pressure on property developers to
maximize available space that many of the Raval’s narrow streets were
perpetually in darkness, while many others allowed no more than a few
shafts of sunlight to enter.
It was no surprise that Ildefons Cerda`, a progressive social thinker
whose utopian plan for rational urban development became the blueprint
for Barcelona’s urban development in 1859, earmarked the Raval’s
overcrowded and insalubrious tenements for destruction.22 Based on the
‘‘grid-iron’’ template, the straight lines of which were characteristic of
the nineteenth-century belief in reason and rational-positivist thought, the
‘‘Cerda` Plan’’ promised to introduce a new urban order in the centre of
Barcelona through the construction of a vast eixample (extension), which
would connect the port with the nearby industrial satellites that had
developed beyond the old city walls. For Cerda`, the Eixample would
become the core of a new socially inclusive, inter-class, functional city in
22. Cerda` was a parliamentary deputy for Barcelona during the ephemeral First Republic
(1868–1874). See Mercedes Nieto de Sangrenı´s, La I Repu´blica espan˜ola en Barcelona
(Barcelona, 1974).
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which people from all walks of life would interact amidst a new equality
and civic unity.23 However, a combination of capital shortages and the
political opposition of property owners in the Raval prevented the full
implementation of this ambitious plan. While some of the old inner-city
slums were sacrificed for the construction of Les Rambles, a central
thoroughfare and the new vertebral column of the city that connected the
port with the Eixample, housing renewal in the Raval was thwarted.
As industrialization continued, urban conditions were aggravated
further. Despite the poor quality of life in this area, the Raval’s proximity
to factories, workshops, and the docks ensured that it continued to attract
migrant workers. Housing shortages and a rising demand for accommoda-
tion resulted in shanty dwellings being constructed on the roofs of
tenements (barraquisme vertical). Meanwhile, the unregulated housing
market meant that rents continued to rise unchecked. From the turn of the
century, therefore, economic imperatives resulted in the subdivision of
existing housing stock, creating what the local labour movement
denounced as ‘‘beehives’’.24 Occasionally several families might occupy
flats designed for a single family in order to share the burden of rent
payments. By 1930, over 230,000 people were packed into the Raval, giving
the area a population density of 103,060 inhabitants per square kilometre.
Not only was the Raval the most densely inhabited neighbourhood in
Barcelona – its population density was almost ten times the city average –
it was also one of the most heavily populated areas of Europe.25
The sanitary consequences of overcrowding were appalling. Diseases
like cholera, typhoid, meningitis, and tuberculosis were rife.26 This was
aggravated further by two factors. Firstly, the Spanish state was slow to
develop welfare functions. The social wage was poor and medical services
were largely nonexistent. Secondly, the Raval’s landlords, although this
terms dignifies what were really slum-lords, were extremely powerful
locally: they dominated the Ca´mara Oficial de la Propiedad Urbana de
Barcelona (COPUB/Barcelona Chamber of Urban Property), the main
landlords’ association in the city, and they had an influential voice in
23. Laboratori d’Urbanisme, Treballs sobre Cerda` i Barcelona (Barcelona, 1992).
24. Jaume Artigas i Vidal et al., El Raval. Histo`ria d’un barri servidor d’una ciutat (Barcelona,
1980), p. 54; Solidaridad Obrera, 14 May 1931.
25. The number of residents per building in the Raval was approximately twice the Barcelona
average. The population of District V, one of Barcelona’s eleven administrative districts which
essentially corresponded to the Raval, grew from 192,828 in 1900 to 230,107 in 1930; Mercedes
Tatjer Mir, ‘‘Els barris obrers del centre histo`ric de Barcelona’’, in Jose´ Luis Oyo´n (ed.), Vida
obrera en la Barcelona de entreguerras (Barcelona, 1998), p. 16; Jaume Aiguader i Miro´, El
problema de l’habitacio´ obrera a Barcelona (Barcelona, 1932), p. 6.
26. Lluı´s Claramunt i Furest, La pesta en el pla de Barcelona (Barcelona, 1933), pp. 6–8; idem,
La Lluita contra la Fibra Tifo`idea a Catalunya (Barcelona, 1933), pp. 189–206; Nick Rider,
‘‘Anarchism, Urbanisation and Social Conflict in Barcelona, 1900–1932’’ (Ph.D., University of
Lancaster, 1987), p. 152.
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Barcelona politics. The position of property owners was, therefore,
virtually unchallenged, and the owners enjoyed immense power over
their working-class tenants.
World War I marked the beginning of the Raval’s economic decline and
the end of its status as Barcelona’s most important industrial district. Spain
was neutral during the war and this placed Barcelona’s capitalists in a
privileged position, allowing them to trade with both belligerent camps.27
The result was a vast industrial and urban revolution, which continued into
the 1920s with the so-called ‘‘Second Industrial Revolution’’, that changed
Barcelona’s urban geography beyond recognition. Modern factories were
established across Barcelona’s expanding industrial hinterland, and a new
‘‘red belt’’ of working-class neighbourhoods emerged on the margins of
the city as industry was spatially reorganized. Although a significant
amount of industry remained in the Raval – for instance, there were
several small textile factories in the area – this was not as competitive and
dynamic as the bigger factories on the outskirts of the city. Moreover,
textile production, which was associated with early industrialization,
merely underlined the Raval’s waning position within the local economy.
As industries relocated away from the Raval, the area gained a new
reputation as a centre for popular leisure. The Raval’s nightlife already
enjoyed a certain standing, both locally and beyond. Once more, this was
intimately tied to Barcelona’s changing historical geography: during the
years before the World Exhibition in 1888, when mass migration had
generated a new demand for urban leisure, numerous cabarets, taverns, and
cafe´s had been established in the Raval to satisfy the demands of the inner-
city proletariat. In particular, there was a significant amount of prostitu-
tion in the area, fuelled by the high demand for sexual services among
migrant male workers, as well as the proximity of a busy port and the
absence of stable employment opportunities for women in the city.28
World War I accentuated these features of social life in the Raval. As the
belle e´poque ended in Paris, Barcelona acquired the nickname of the ‘‘Paris
of the South’’. The international ‘‘party set’’ of idle rich, playboys, and
adventurers decamped to neutral Barcelona and converted it into their new
playground. They were followed by a varied group of individuals who, for
one reason or another, wanted to escape the war, and which included
racketeers, gangsters, and drug smugglers. Draft dodgers and professional
revolutionaries also came, the most famous of whom was Victor Serge,
27. According to one bourgeois literary figure, World War I ‘‘brought the nineteenth century to
a close in Barcelona’’; Josep Marı´a de Sagarra, Memo`ries, 2 vols (Barcelona, 1981), vol. 1, p. 290.
28. Temma Kaplan, Red City, Blue Period: Social Movements in Picasso’s Barcelona (Berkeley,
CA, 1992), pp. 111–112. For a more detailed survey, see Cristina Borderias, ‘‘Women Workers in
the Barcelona Labour Market, 1856–1936’’, in Angel Smith (ed.), Red Barcelona: Social Protest
and Labour Mobilization in the Twentieth Century (London, 2002), pp. 142–166.
379Barcelona’s ‘‘Chinatown’’, c.1835–1936
who captured the flavour of the period in his novel, Naissance de notre
force.29 The new arrivals stimulated a surge in demand for, and provision
of illegal leisure activities, particularly prostitution, and for the first time it
proved necessary to import young women to Barcelona via the port to
meet the increased demand for sexual services.30 There was also a rise in the
drugs trade, notably opium, and in illegal gaming.
Another characteristic of this period was the emergence of private
security groups, some of which organized protection rackets in a city that
was awash with guns. As in many other port cities, it had long been
relatively easy to acquire firearms in Barcelona, but the wartime expansion
of the Spanish arms industry meant that the illegal arms market was
flooded and weapons could be obtained very cheaply. Yet, more than
anything, these armed security groups flourished due to the growing
insecurity of Barcelona’s capitalists.31 Foreign intelligence agents were
very active at this time and they organized several attacks on industrialists
and their property in an attempt to sabotage war production.32
The general expansion of so-called ‘‘underworld’’ activities during the
war provided much of the inspiration for the Chinatown myth in the
1920s. It should be noted that the term ‘‘underworld’’ is best treated with
caution, not least because it is a morally charged and politically loaded
discursive tool. In terms of Barcelona’s social relationships, the term is an
inadequate sociological tool. First of all, Barcelona’s underworld was
always socially stratified. Second, the underworld elite had always
intersected with Barcelona’s ‘‘aboveworld’’ elite and the relationship
between the two was mutually supportive. In a sense, this was inevitable
owing to the institutionalized corruption of Spain’s Restoration monarchy
(1875–1923). From the 1880s onwards, it was widely recognized by
internal police sources that the Barcelona constabulary was heavily
implicated in arms smuggling, prostitution, illegal gambling, drugs rackets,
and other criminal activities.33 By the turn of the century, La policı´a
espan˜ola, the professional journal of the Spanish police, observed that the
main activity of the Barcelona constabulary was the ‘‘framing’’ of innocent
29. According to one local, in World War I, ‘‘Barcelona became a haven for all the persecuted
agitators from across Europe’’; Joan Garriga i Masso´, Memo`ries d’un liberal catalanista (1871–
1939) (Barcelona, 1987), pp. 221–222.
30. This was described as the ‘‘white slave trade’’ (trata de blanques); see, for instance, El
Esca´ndalo, 14 October 1926.
31. Ealham, ‘‘Class and the City’’, pp. 33–47.
32. Angel Pestan˜a, Terrorismo en Barcelona (Memorias ine´ditas) (Barcelona, 1979), pp. 83–96.
For a penetrating analysis, see Eduardo Gonza´lez Calleja and Fernando del Rey Reguillo,
‘‘Viole`ncia polı´tica i pistolerisme a la Catalunya de la primera posguerra mundial’’, L’Avenc¸, 192
(1995), pp. 34–41.
33. Waldo Lo´pez Rodrı´guez, Proyecto de Reorganizacio´n de la Policia de Espan˜a (Zaragoza,
1899), pp. 10–11.
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citizens, and that the eradication of crime could only be achieved after the
incarceration of the city’s policemen!34
Corruption grew during the wartime economic boom. In business, the
dividing line between legal and illegal commerce, a distinction that had
never been especially clear anyway, was further blurred.35 Professional
criminals and the industrial elite occupied the same social space, freely
mixing in Barcelona’s casinos, upmarket bordellos, and gentlemen’s
clubs.36 Perhaps the most graphic example of the overlap between criminal
and official worlds is the case of Barcelona’s corrupt chief of police, Bravo
Portillo, who worked as a German intelligence agent for part of the war,
facilitating information on ship movements to U-boat commanders in
Barcelona port.37 Bravo Portillo also collaborated with the self-styled
‘‘Baro´n del Ko¨nig’’, an enigmatic playboy and former German agent who
typified the type of adventurer who prospered in wartime Barcelona:
together, the Baro´n and the chief of police organized protection rackets
and contract killings and enjoyed the patronage and protection of local
authorities and elites. Later, when it emerged that the Baro´n del Ko¨nig had
stimulated demand for his security firm by organizing gun attacks on
employers, he was was deported from Spain.38
A significant amount of this expanded illegal activity centred on the
Raval.39 In part, this was because the surge in demand for new places of
leisure and pleasure coincided with the area’s industrial transition. Thus,
many of the Raval’s newly vacated warehouses and workshops were
hastily converted into cabarets, dance halls, and taverns.40 For instance,
34. La policı´a espan˜ola, cited in Pedro Trinidad Ferna´ndez, La defensa de la sociedad. Ca´rcel y
delincuencia en Espan˜a (siglos XVIII–XX) (Madrid, 1991), pp. 298–309.
35. One analyst of the 1920s reflected that ‘‘the classic swindle and the cloudy business deal were
the order of the day’’ in financial circles; Jose´ Luis Vila, La vida cotidiana en Espan˜a durante la
dictadura de Primo de Rivera (Barcelona, 1984), p. 64. For a case study of one such ‘‘deviant’’
entrepeneur, see Ramo´n Garriga, Juan March y su tiempo (Barcelona, 1976).
36. Front, 30 July 1932, a dissident communist publication, exposed the existence of upmarket
brothels in the Eixample.
37. Solidaridad Obrera, 9 and 11 June 1918.
38. The real identity of the ‘‘Baro´n’’ remains a mystery. According to one former Barcelona
police chief, his name was Friederich Stallmann; Manuel Casal Go´mez, La ‘‘banda negra’’.
Origen y actuacio´n de los pistoleros en Barcelona (1918–1921) (Barcelona, 1977), pp. 27–28.
There is also speculation that his original surname is believed to have been Colman or Ko¨lmann.
To add to the confusion, his nom de guerre is frequently misspelt. Besides working for German
secret services, it has also been claimed that the Baro´n was employed by either British or French
intelligence. After his deportation from Spain in May 1920, he apparently settled in Paris, where
he dedicated himself to extortion and blackmail, before changing his identity and disappearing
without trace; Jordi Ventura, ‘‘La personalitat veritable del baro´ de Ko¨nig’’, Serra D’Or,
September 1970, pp. 81–84.
39. This was reflected in Jean Genet’s 1949 Journal de voleur (The Thief’s Journal), inspired by
the author’s experiences in the area during the interwar period.
40. Pedro Gual Villalbı´, Memorias de un industrial de nuestro tiempo (Barcelona, n.d.), pp. 138,
140. According to Garriga i Masso´, ‘‘Barcelona was the European city which took over from fin
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‘‘La Criolla’’, a much-frequented cabaret and brothel, opened in 1915 in a
former textile factory.41 At the same time, new clandestine establishments
were founded, such as opium dens, brothels, and illegal gaming rooms,
while several protection agencies were located in and around the area; for
example, the Baro´n del Ko¨nig had an office on Les Rambles, on the edge of
the Raval.
Yet notwithstanding all these changes, the Raval continued to be a
working-class district.42 By 1900, municipal statistics revealed that one-
fifth of the city proletariat resided in the Raval.43 Moreover, from the
1880s onwards, members of the middle and upper classes had left the area
for the Eixample, the ordered residential space they idealized as a new city
of reason. The confidence of the remaining upper- and middle-class
families in the area was rocked by the urban riots of 1909,44 prompting
them to flee the Raval, whereupon their flats were subdivided for multiple
occupancy by working-class families. Thereafter, social divisions were
increasingly inscribed in the streets and districts of the city: the working
class and the bourgeoisie established relatively autonomous patterns of
sociability, and there was little contact between these classes outside the
factory.
From their vantage point in the Eixample, the elites quite literally
looked down nervously upon the Raval as a centre of irrationality
populated by what they saw as the ‘‘perishing classes’’. Moreover, in their
everyday life in the city, it was difficult for the ‘‘men of order’’ to ignore
the Raval’s ‘‘dangerous classes’’: we see from Figure 1 (p. 384) the
proximity of the Liceu (no. 9), the Barcelona opera house and the cultural
citadel of the city’s bourgeoisie, along with many administrative centres
(nos 39 and 41) and business offices on Laietana Way (no. 36).
During the 1910s, the Raval’s housing market evolved into an integral
element of Barcelona’s low-wage, casual economy.45 The few better-off
de sie`cle Paris [:::] it was the oasis of Europe, where happiness and joie de vivre were possible’’;
Memo`ries, pp. 213–214.
41. Abel Rebollo et al. (eds), Barcelona rebelde. Guı´a de una ciudad silenciada (Barcelona, 2003),
p. 255.
42. According to one study of the Raval, the population was of ‘‘eminently working-class social
composition’’; Artigas i Vidal, El Raval, p. 51. This view was confirmed by one resident from the
interwar era, ‘‘they were workers, colliers, stevedores [:::]. There were whores, pimps, hoods, but
only the minority’’; cited in McDonogh, ‘‘The Geography of Evil’’, p. 176.
43. Figures cited in Tatjer Mir, ‘‘Els barris obrers [:::]’’, in Oyo´n, Vida obrera en la Barcelona de
entreguerras, pp. 14, 22, 30.
44. One middle-class observer lamented that ‘‘the rebellious masses were masters of the city for
eight days’’; Garriga i Masso´, Memo`ries, p. 182.
45. Lluı´s Claramunt i Furest, Problemes d’urbanisme (Barcelona, 1934), pp. 14–18; Carme
Massana, Indu´stria, ciutat i propietat. Polı´tica econo´mica i propietat urbana a l’A´rea de Barcelona
(1901–1939) (Barcelona, 1985), pp. 22, 126–130; Aiguader i Miro´, El problema de l’habitacio´
obrera, p. 14; Front, 30 July 1932; Artigas i Vidal, El Raval, pp. 51ff.
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workers in the area moved out and the district increasingly catered for the
poorest sections of the working class.46 One of the area’s unique
characteristics was its concentration of ‘‘doss’’- or ‘‘flop’’-houses which
provided rooms for single, male, unskilled migrant labourers who could
not afford a deposit for a rented flat.47 Several former factories were
converted into dosshouses, which consolidated the area’s status as a place
of transit for migrant workers.48 Part of what has been described as the
picaresque proletariat of sailors, dockers, and itinerant labourers,49 these
workers were attracted by the opportunities for casual, sweated labour in
the area, especially on the waterfront.50 The picaresque proletariat was also
much enamoured of the raw pleasures available in the cabarets and taverns
that gave the Raval its distinctive atmosphere of proletarian bohemia. Such
masterless men had little sense of deferred gratification: they worked hard
and played harder and rougher still. It was their behaviour that inspired
many of the moral panics about the Raval’s inhabitants. But alongside the
picaresque proletariat there was a much, much larger working-class
community, which comprised the bulk of the Raval’s population. This
relatively sedentary community was far removed from the Chinatown
stereotypes of the drug-crazed pimp or the drunken docker. Importantly,
despite the internal stratification within the local working class, the social
context in the Raval was broadly similar for all workers: they were
overwhelmingly unskilled or semiskilled workers with few bargaining
resources; they survived on subsistence wages; they lived in unmoder-
nized, overcrowded housing and faced an overarching structure of material
coercion in their everyday lives.
It would be wrong, however, to give the impression that Raval was
merely a place of misery and despair. Certainly, there was incalculable
poverty but, contrary to the Chinatown legend and the portrayal of the
area as an unruly space, there was a social and cultural order: it was a
rough, aggressive and assertive working-class order. It was this rival order
that drove terror into the hearts of urban elites.
46. Tatjer Mir, ‘‘Els barris obrers’’, pp. 14, 19.
47. One dosshouse was known locally as ‘‘the three eights’’ after the number of daily shifts in the
beds; Rafael Vidiella, Los de ayer (Barcelona, 1938), p. 33. In some of these flophouses one didn’t
flop at all: these consisted of large rooms with a rope in the centre against which workers leaned
and slept standing up.
48. Conditions were abysmal in old industrial buildings that were not designed for their new
purpose; Manuel Gil Maestre, La criminalidad en Barcelona y en las grandes poblaciones
(Barcelona, 1886), pp. 147–157; Paco Villar, Historia y leyenda del Barrio Chino (1900–1992).
Cro´nica y documentos de los bajos fondos de Barcelona (Barcelona, 1996), pp. 37–41; Joan
Busquets Grau, Barcelona. Evolucio´n urbanı´stica de una capital compacta (Madrid, 1992), p. 213;
Tatjer Mir, ‘‘Els barris obrers’’, p. 29.
49. Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves,
Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic (Boston, MA, 2001).
50. De Bellmunt, Les Catacumbes de Barcelona, pp. 35–36.
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There were various coordinates to this working-class order. Its first
dimension was a high degree of sociability. Due to overcrowded housing,
the Raval’s streets functioned as an extension of the home, resulting in
frequent and intense direct human interactions. Also, in response to the
material problems of everyday life, workers developed mutual and
reciprocal practices. In turn, these rituals fostered extensive social bonds
among the community, which was endowed with a fierce spirit of
independence. The second central element of this working-class order
was a profound sense of local identity. In many respects this was a spatial
identity, a sense of attachment to a place, or what Raymond Williams
described as ‘‘militant particularism’’.51 It was a vision of the world based
on working-class materiality and practice: it was situated knowledge
rooted in urban experience. The strength of this identity reflects the
remarkable level of socio-economic and cultural homogeneity that bound
the Raval’s inhabitants together.52
The final element of the Raval’s order was a vibrant working-class
public sphere. Trade unions were the most important organization within
this counter-hegemonic public sphere. The Raval was the capital not just of
the local labour movement, but also of the Spanish workers’ movement: it
was the site of first ever national workers’ congress in 1870 and Spain’s
earliest trade unions were formed here (the socialist Unio´n General de
Trabajadores (UGT/General Workers’ Union) was created there in 1888).
Figure 1. Inner-city Barcelona, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The map reflects
the urban reforms of 1859, 1908–1911, and 1926–1929.
1. The Eixample (Extension), the area of hexagonal-shaped streets; 2. Plaza of the University; 3.
Palayo St; 4. Plaza of Catalunya; 5. The Rambla; 6. The Flower Market; 7. Boqueria, St Joseph
Market; 8. Church of Pi, St Mary of the Pine Tree; 9. The Lyceum; 10. New Street of the Rambla;
11. Eden Concert; 12. Gu¨ell Palace; 13. Royal Plaza; 14. The Parallel, Marquis of Duero Avenue;
15. Pompey Music Hall; 16. Castle of Montjuich; 17. Museum of Catalan Art; 18. Spanish
Village; 19. Plaza of Spain; 20. Arenas Bullring; 21. St Anthony Market; 22. Plaza of Padro´; 23.
Atarazanas Barracks; 24. Columbus Monument; 25. Basilica of the Virgin of Mercy; 26. Avinyo
St; 28. Plaza of the Palace; 29. St Mary of the Sea; 30. Born Plaza; 31. Citadel Park; 32. Tetuan
Plaza; 33. Main St; 34. Gracia Pass; 35. Telephone and Telegraph Exchange; 36. Laietana Way; 37.
Four Cats Cafe´; 38. Cathedral; 39. Provincial government building/Generalitat/Diputacio´n; 40.
Plaza of St James; 41. City Hall.
Map adapted from Temma Kaplan, Red City, Blue Period: Social Movements in Picasso’s
Barcelona (Berkeley, CA, 1992), pp. 200–201. Used with permission.
51. Raymond Williams, Resources of Hope: Culture, Democracy, Socialism (London, 1989),
pp. 115, 242, 249.
52. For the impact of social segregation on consciousness, see Richard Dennis, ‘‘People and
Housing in Industrial Society’’, in Michael Pacione (ed.), Historical Geography: Progress and
Prospects (London, 1987), p. 191; Richard Harris, ‘‘Residential Segregation and Class Formation
in the Capitalist City’’, Progress in Human Geography, 8 (1984), pp. 26–49.
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After the Madrid-based socialist leadership relocated the UGT’s head-
quarters to Madrid in 1899,53 the Raval became a bastion of Barcelona’s
popular anarcho-syndicalist movement, which established a network of
trade-union offices and social and cultural centres in the area. During times
of repression, trade unionists regularly met clandestinely in the neighbour-
hoods’ masculine spaces, such as taverns and bars.54
In addition, the Raval was home to a myriad of cooperatives, friendly
societies, workers’ educational centres, and radical publishing houses and
newspapers.55 This workers’ public sphere built upon the Raval’s
spontaneous sociability, marrying local traditions of autonomy and
reciprocity with the new ties of loyalty and affinity produced by
workers’ organization. The anarcho-syndicalists reaffirmed the Raval’s
Figure 2. Labourers sleeping in a Raval dosshouse located in a former factory.
Francesc Bonamusa, Pere Gabriel, Josep Lluı´s Martı´n Ramos, and Josep Termes, Histo`ria Gra`fica
del Moviment Obrer a Catalunya (Barcelona, 1989), p. 191. Used with permission.
53. See Xavier Cuadrat, Socialismo y anarquismo en Catalun˜a (1899–1911). Los orı´genes de la
CNT (Madrid, 1976); Joaquı´n Maurı´n, ‘‘Pablo Iglesias y el pabloiglesismo’’, L’Opinio´, 22
December 1928.
54. Emili Salut, Vivers de revolucionaris. Apunts histo`rics del Districte Cinque` (Barcelona, 1938),
pp. 147–148.
55. The list is vast. See, for example, Ferran Aisa, Una Histo`ria de Barcelona. Ateneu Encicope`dic
Popular (1902–1999) (Barcelona, 2000).
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spirit of independence, celebrating the ‘‘goodness’’ of the ‘‘pariahs’’ who
inhabited its ‘‘streets [that] were stained with so much proletarian
blood’’.56 The workers’ public sphere also enhanced key features of the
neighbourhood’s local identity; for instance, one of the local workers’
newspapers, which was titled Los Miserables, underscored the material
impoverishment of the Raval’s inhabitants.57 For many of the area’s
residents, this was a ‘‘space of hope’’;58 for the anarcho-syndicalists, it was
a revolutionary heartland, a centre for emancipatory urban politics, a
‘‘nursery for revolutionaries’’.59 Meanwhile, middle-class political parties
only had a token presence in the Raval, something that served only to
increase elite suspicions of the area.60
Inevitably, the Raval was the site of violent conflicts between labour and
capital and of state repression.61 Local traditions of direct-action protest,
rioting, and barricade building extended back to the 1830s: in the 1835 La
Bonaplata riot, workers destroyed new technology which they perceived
as a threat to their job security. Church property was also attacked and
social protest frequently acquired an anti-clerical thrust. Direct-action
protest was heavily inscribed in the collective memory of local workers
and their urban insurgency endured well into the twentieth century. In
1902, Spain’s first general strike had its epicentre in the Raval: barricades
were erected and food was forcibly requisitioned from bakeries and
markets in a manner that resembled the consumption riots of the
nineteenth century. This strike, like many later conflicts, drew strength
from the area’s solidarities and its aggressive street culture: large crowds
consisting of men, women, and children took to the streets to defend their
neighbourhood from outside agencies, such as the police. When the
security forces attempted to enter the area, they came under sustained
attack in the streets, missiles raining down upon them from the windows
and rooftops of the tenements. The protest ended with military repression
and several deaths.62 The Raval rose again in 1909, when anti-war protests
culminated in full-scale urban insurrection, barricades, street-fighting, and
56. Solidaridad Obrera, 9 April 1933, 20 March 1934, 15 September 1935; La Revista Blanca, 19
April 1935.
57. Josep Maria Huertas Claveria, ‘‘La polı´tica en un barri apolı´tic’’, in Claudio Zulia´n (ed.),
Escenes del Raval (Barcelona, 1999), p. 30.
58. David Harvey, Spaces of Hope (Edinburgh, 2000).
59. Salut, Vivers de revolucionaris.
60. Isidre Molas, Lliga Catalana. Un estudi d’Estasiologia, 2 vols (Barcelona, 1972), vol. 1,
p. 304.
61. See the pioneering studies by Pere Lo´pez Sa´nchez: El centro histo´rico: un lugar para el
conflicto (Barcelona, 1986), and Un verano con mil julios y otras estaciones. Barcelona: de la
Reforma Interior a la Revolucio´n de Julio de 1909 (Madrid, 1993).
62. Joaquı´n Romero Maura, ‘‘La Rosa del Fuego’’. Republicanos y anarquistas: la polı´tica de los
obreros barceloneses entre el desastre colonial y la Semana Tra´gica, 1899–1909 (Barcelona, 1989),
pp. 210–211; Angel Duarte, ‘‘Entre el mito y la realidad. Barcelona 1902’’, Ayer, 4 (1991), p. 166.
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widespread church burning across Barcelona.63 Evoking images of the
Paris Commune, the last remaining barricades were obliterated with
cannon-fire. Before World War I, then, when Barcelona earned the
nickname ‘‘the Paris of the South’’, the Catalan capital had already
inherited the mantle of nineteenth-century Paris as the revolutionary
capital of Europe. And within the city, not without justification,
revolutionaries predicted that it was from within the Raval that ‘‘the
exterminating angels of the bourgeoisie will rise up’’.64
The final set of mobilizations in the Raval prior to the creation of the
Chinatown myth came at the end of World War I. The war-time boom
enhanced the size of the local working class and bolstered the ranks of the
anarcho-syndicalist Confederacio´n Nacional del Trabajo (CNT/National
Confederation of Labour), as Barcelona became possibly the most
unionized city in Europe.65 Even some of the Raval’s musicians were
unionized, and when they went on strike for wage increases in 1922 they
successfully closed down around twenty cabaret venues.
In response to the newly concentrated power of labour, when the war
ended the most militant sections of the Catalan bourgeoisie resorted to
union-busting tactics, including extra-judicial assassination. There fol-
lowed the so-called ‘‘years of gun law’’ (an˜os del pistolerismo), when right-
wing gunmen and fortune-hunters, such as the Baro´n del Ko¨nig, were
bankrolled by industrialists to murder trade unionists. Together with the
disgraced former police chief Bravo Portillo, Baro´n del Ko¨nig organized
the ‘‘black gang’’ (banda negra), which assassinated a number of leading
worker-activists.66 During the pistolerismo era, the Raval was the site of
low-intensity urban-guerrilla warfare and, unsurprisingly, most of the
gun-related deaths in Barcelona at this time occurred here.67 In a bid to
defend the CNT’s space in society, the unions and anarchist groups
formed rival ‘‘action squads’’ to hit back against right-wing gunmen and
their sponsors. Several of these action squads were based in the Raval,
where they benefited from the active or passive support of local workers;
as a minimum, they knew they would not be betrayed to the police by
63. On 1909, see Pere Lo´pez Sa´nchez, Un verano con mil julios y otras estaciones. Barcelona: de
la Reforma Interior a la Revolucio´n de Julio de 1909 (Madrid, 1993); Romero Maura, ‘‘La Rosa
del Fuego’’; Joan Connelly Ullman, The Tragic Week: A Study of Anticlericalism in Spain, 1875–
1912 (Cambridge, MA, 1968). For a more recent analysis of general strikes in Barcelona, see
Angel Smith, ‘‘Anarchism, the General Strike and the Barcelona Labour Movement’’, European
History Quarterly, 27 (1997), pp. 5–40.
64. Vidiella, Los de ayer, p. 93.
65. Ealham, ‘‘Class and the City’’, pp. 33–47.
66. Bravo Portillo was known popularly as a ‘‘pimp’’ (xulo); Montserrat Roig, Rafael Vidiella,
l’aventura de la revolucio´ (Barcelona, 1976), p. 40. His assassination prompted an outpouring of
popular celebrations and parties were held across the city. See Adolfo Bueso, Recuerdos de un
cenetista, 2 vols (l’Esplugues de Llobregat, 1976), vol. 1, pp. 126–128.
67. Ama`lia Pradas, ‘‘Pistoles i pistolers’’, p. 15.
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Figure 3. Members of the community – men, women and children – constructing a barricade in
the Raval during the July 1909 ‘‘Tragic Week’’.
Copyright: Ballell, Arxiu Fotogra`fic de l’Arxiu Histo`ric de la Ciutat de Barcelona. Used with
permission.
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members of the community who recognized them as their own, as a
product of the local environment.
The Raval was, therefore, the most vibrant and defiant working-class
neighbourhood in the city. Contrary to the Chinatown legend, it was not
the case that the Raval was immoral; it was more that the neighbourhood
rejected the morality of the urban elites, its rich local identity proving
largely impermeable to bourgeois cultural politics. And this rebel culture
was embedded within the Raval’s narrow, randomly organized streets,
which proved difficult for the authorities to regulate and submit to
external control. This was the genuine source of the alarm felt by urban
elites, who were fully apprised of the serious problems that the loyalties
and solidarities of the Raval posed for the urban order.68 Here also lies the
key to the origins of the Chinatown myth: in the consciousness and in the
collective memory of Barcelona’s men of order, the Raval was an
inherently refractory and disorderly place. The social construction of
Chinatown, therefore, conveniently allowed a slum myth to be imposed
on Barcelona’s oldest and most rebellious working-class community.
T H E P O L I T I C A L U S E S O F T H E C H I N A T O W N M Y T H
Chinatown discourse was more than an outpouring of dystopian despair.
It served an array of political uses: it was a declaration of the readiness of
urban elites to intervene in the social organization of the city in order to
reclaim both symbolic and physical space,69 and it formed part of a project
to assert control over the local working class, both inside and outside the
workplace.70 In other terms, Chinatown was part of a hegemonic struggle,
a means of exerting cultural domination and reasserting state authority
over a defiant community, a conservative ideological weapon in a ‘‘cultural
politics of place’’.71 It therefore justified social and state intervention in the
Raval in an effort to interrupt and break down the profound working-class
resistances, traditions, and identities in the area. This can be seen in the
manner in which the Raval was constructed as a ‘‘wild land’’ or an unruly
wilderness which, accordingly, had to be tamed.72 And, because, according
to Chinatown discourse, the Raval lacked moral content, civilization had
68. For example, El Liberal, 4 September 1901, spoke of the ‘‘close solidarity’’ of ‘‘the worker
masses’’.
69. See K.J. Anderson, ‘‘Cultural Hegemony and the Race-Definition Process in Chinatown,
Vancouver: 1880–1980’’, Society and Space, 6 (1988), pp. 127–149.
70. For Driver, ‘‘moral geographies’’ were ‘‘part of a process of appropriation (and, hence,
regulation) of the spaces of everyday life [:::], participants in the reconstruction of urban space’’;
‘‘Moral geographies’’, p. 276.
71. David Harvey, Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference (Cambridge, MA, 1996),
pp. 321–322.
72. For a discussion, see ibid., p. 320.
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to be imported, thus creating a new moral landscape. Accordingly,
Chinatown discourse would have profound material consequences for
the Raval.
One of the most striking political features of Chinatown discourse is
that it provided common ground for Barcelona’s fragmented and
factionalized elites. These elites were politically divided among liberals,
conservatives, centralists, Home Rulers (autonomists), catholics, anti-
clericals, republicans, and monarchists. Although liberals and conserva-
tives might have disagreed over the balance between reform and
repression, Chinatown discourse reflected shared views among the men
of order about the desirability of a new disciplinary order, about the
seriousness of the threat from below, and about the importance of control
and vigilance. Chinatown moral panics placed the accent on the urgent
need to resist the ‘‘diseased mob’’ that had escaped the control of authority
and of all reasonable morality. If left unchecked, this ‘‘internal enemy’’
would ‘‘infect’’ the rest of the city, damage family life and destroy urban
civilization as it existed.73 Inevitably, given such high stakes, the men of
order would have to close ranks.
Equally, the ambiguities of Chinatown discourse meant that it could
appeal to different elite factions. Understandably, there was disagreement
over the causes of Chinatown – conservatives saw it in quite narrow moral
terms, as a consequence of the erosion of old traditional values and
patterns of social control occasioned by the advent of mass society and the
massified city,74 wheras liberal opinion invoked Chinatown as evidence of
the need for a far-reaching reform programme. However, Spanish
liberalism was anything but indulgent: liberals saw ‘‘order’’ as a precondi-
tion for reform and they were often as insistent and draconian as
conservatives in their readiness to pacify Chinatown.75
El Esca´ndolo typified this trend within Spanish liberalism. Part of
Spain’s growing anti-monarchist opposition in the 1920s, El Esca´ndolo was
identified with progressive opinion or, what it called, ‘‘a liberal conception
of life’’; not without humour, the paper’s subtitle described it as a ‘‘modern
weekly of sensationalist articles and pacifist struggle’’.76 The paper
championed a modern style of journalism that charted the growth of
urban society: its contributors were drawn heavily from the professional
middle class and included physicians, lawyers, and civil servants; the focus
of the paper was also explicitly urban – all its journalists were obsessed
73. Lo´pez, Barcelona sucia, foresaw that an unchecked Chinatown could corrupt youth and
result in ‘‘the end of Spain’’; pp. 54–56, 56.
74. Gual Villalbı´, Memorias, pp. 132–136, 169.
75. Paco Madrid, Ocho meses y un dı´a en el gobierno civil de Barcelona (Barcelona, 1932),
pp. 143–145, 171–214.
76. El Esca´ndolo, 10 December 1926.
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with city life: they revelled in and were simultaneously repelled by the
darker side of the city. Significantly, however, alongside this air of political
modernity, the spatial commentary in El Esca´ndolo was heavily inflected
by the discourse of nineteenth-century urban reformers and moralists and
revealed an unswerving fixation with the preservation of order.
The united front of the elites can be seen in the way in which liberals,
conservatives, and Catalan nationalists agreed that Chinatown was at
variance with the prevailing mores and norms of Barcelona: it was
described as being ‘‘independent of the rest of Barcelona’’,77 as having
morally seceded from the city. In this respect, the Chinatown myth was
the culmination of four decades of elite disquiet about the nefarious effects
of urbanization on egoism, criminality, immorality, and alcoholism; it
constituted a restatement of the ‘‘dangerous-classes’’ discourse of the
1880s, an older Europe-wide language of power that encapsulated a
profound pessimism about the consequences of urbanization.78 Indeed, in
the case of Barcelona, fears of the dangerous classes had long focused on
the Raval;79 as El Esca´ndolo observed, the area was ‘‘the longstanding
concern of the sensible people and the men of order’’.80
Liberals and conservatives also endorsed contemporary western racial
prejudices about the assumed deviancy and dirtiness of Chinese immi-
grants. Although there was no Chinese community in Barcelona at this
time, anti-oriental racism was very much in evidence among local
politicians and elites. Even radical left-wing republicans, such as the
L’Opinio´ group, denounced Japanese imperialism as the ‘‘yellow peril’’.81
There was, moreover, a local tradition of invoking racial categories to
exoticize specific spaces that challenged the urban order in Barcelona: in
the 1880s, a shanty community established by homeless migrant workers
on the beach, near the major industrial district of Poblenou, was christened
Peking (Pekı´n) by local commentators, some forty-odd years before the
invention of Chinatown.
Catalan nationalists were especially fond of externalizing social
problems. They, like many other elite groups, also adopted a colonial-
type discourse to racialize the working class – both Catalan and migrant –
along with social problems and conflicts. Hence, they invariably referred
to Chinatown as the Barrio Chino, in Spanish and not in Catalan, the
suggestion being that the area’s problems were explicable in terms of
77. El Esca´ndolo, 21 January 1926.
78. Lo´pez, Barcelona sucia, is the best example of this discourse applied to Barcelona. For
Europe, see Andrew Lees, Cities Perceived: Urban Society in European and American Thought,
1820–1940 (Manchester, 1985), esp. chs 5–7.
79. Before World War I, the Raval was described by one local liberal paper as an ‘‘inferno’’;
L’Esquella de la Torratxa, 11 April 1913.
80. El Esca´ndolo, 20 May 1926.
81. L’Opinio´, 18 May 1932.
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migration from Spain’s depressed agricultural regions. Some Catalan
nationalists even described the Raval as ‘‘Barcelona’s Andalusia’’.82 The
great attraction of externalizing the Raval was that it avoided asking
awkward questions about social justice, urban crisis, and the inequalities
between rich and poor districts.
Official concern with Chinatown reached its peak in the 1930s, during
the Second Republic, when several former contributors to El Esca´ndolo
occupied important political positions.83 A broad political consensus
formed around the ‘‘problem’’ of Chinatown as the single most important
challenge to Barcelona’s social order. Chinatown became the abiding
concern for a coalition of middle-class ‘‘experts’’. In the vanguard were
members of the medical profession, both physicians and psychiatrists, who
routinely employed medical language to diagnose the Raval as a ‘‘diseased’’
space.84 A good example of this current was Dr Jaume Aiguader i Miro´, a
former social democrat and Barcelona’s mayor during the Republic. The
author of several studies on housing and social conditions in the city,
Aiguader i Miro´ denounced the ‘‘perversity’’ of the Raval.85 This message
was amplified further by housing reformers, urban planners, criminolo-
gists, municipal administrators, local politicians, and social reformers.
Chinatown panics also found an echo in the labour movement in the 1930s,
in no small part due to the El Esca´ndolo journalists, several of whom had
connections with Barcelona’s small reformist trade unions and political
groups, such as the Unio´ Socialista de Catalunya (USC/Socialist Union of
Catalonia). For these social democrats, not only were the crude, hedonistic
pleasures of Chinatown an affront to their sense of proletarian respect-
ability and deferred gratification, they also claimed that their anarchist
rivals were in alliance with ‘‘underground parasites’’ and a lumpenprole-
tariat of ‘‘professional layabouts and thieves’’.86
For this broad coalition of groups, the great political advantage of
Chinatown was that it allowed for a variety of distinct and separate
challenges to the urban order (revolutionaries, professional criminals, drug
82. L’Opinio´, 22 September 1933, 7 April, 9 August 1934.
83. For instance, Paco Madrid was secretary to various Barcelona civil governors, including
fellow El Esca´ndolo writer, Carles Espla´, Marcelino Domingo was a cabinet minister on more
than one occasion, while Angel Samblancat was elected to parliament at the start of the Republic.
84. One liberal medical reformer argued that Chinatown had to be demolished on moral and
health grounds, an act of ‘‘moral and material cleansing’’ that would end illness linked to
overcrowded housing and ‘‘nocturnal life in cabarets and other places of doubtful morality’’;
Claramunt i Furest, Problemes d’urbanisme, pp. 9, 14.
85. A physician by training, Aiguader i Miro´ had published widely on ‘‘the working-class
condition’’ and housing matters; see his El problema de l’habitacio´ obrera. He wrote of the
‘‘perversity’’ of the Raval in Mirador, 23 May 1929.
86. See Justicia Social, 1 August 1931, 13 May, and 7 October 1933. According to the USC,
anarchist mobilizations were ‘‘the action of the underworld, to which a minority of adventurers
of working class origins had descended’’; Justicia Social, 29 April 1933.
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dealers, pimps, and other anti-social types) to be labelled and amalgamated
as if they formed a concerted campaign against the established order.87
Accordingly, the Raval’s political and economic conflicts were crimina-
lized, the anarchist movement placed on the same moral plane as the
underworld, and a politically problematic community came to be defined
in terms of public order. Crudely put, Chinatown provided an opportu-
nity to alter popular attitudes towards the role of the state and justify state
coercion: it reduced complex socio-economic and political questions to a
problem of law and order.88 In practice, this legitimated a myriad of
morality campaigns, reform plans, temperance drives, literacy initiatives,
and, most of all, police repression. All these measures were designed to
isolate the ‘‘deserving’’ poor from the ‘‘undeserving’’, the ‘‘respectable’’
from the ‘‘rough’’, and the ‘‘moderates’’ from ‘‘extremists’’. The ‘‘healthy’’
elements could then be safely coopted into ‘‘respectable’’ society, while the
‘‘degenerate and recalcitrant’’ elements would be subjected to measures of
‘‘social hygiene and cleansing’’.89
The obsession with reordering Chinatown culminated in the 1934
‘‘Macia` Plan’’90, a modernist blueprint for a ‘‘New Barcelona’’ (Barcelona
nova) based on the violent destruction of the Raval in accordance with the
new ideology of regional planning.91 Commissioned in spring 1932, the
Macia` Plan was a collaborative venture between a local technocratic think-
tank, the Grup d’Arquitectes i Te`cnics Catalans (Catalan Technicans’ and
Architects’ Group/GATCPAC), and Le Corbusier, the Svengali of
modernist urban-technocratic utopias. (The plan took its name after Le
Corbusier met with Catalan President Macia` – Le Corbusier’s admiration
of authority obliged him to name the project in honour of his patron.)92
Inspired by Le Corbusier’s maxim, ‘‘Architecture or Revolution. Revolu-
tion can be avoided’’,93 the crux of the plan was the demolition of the
Raval.
On one occasion, Lluı´s Companys, who succeeded Macia` as Catalan
87. Thus, one conservative spoke of a ‘‘network of secret organizations’’ in this ‘‘crime zone’’,
made up of foreign anarchists and ‘‘common criminals’’; Fernando Barango´-Solı´s, Reportajes
Pintorescos (Barcelona, 1934), pp. 109–113. For similar themes developed in the republican press,
see La Publicitat, 10 April 1934.
88. For a classic discussion of this process in 1970s Britain, see Stuart Hall, Chas Critcher, Tony
Jefferson, John Clarke, and Brian Roberts, Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State and Law and
Order (London, 1978), who talk of the ‘‘mapping together’’ of ‘‘moral panics’’ into a ‘‘general
panic’’ (pp. 218–227).
89. For examples of this language see Justicia Social, 15, 22 July 1933, and L’Opinio´, 21 August, 2
December 1931, 22 October 1933.
90. Francesc Roca, El Pla Macia` (Barcelona, 1977).
91. Nicolau Rubio´ i Tudurı´, Pla de distribucio´ en zones del territori catala` (Barcelona, 1932).
92. Evidence of Le Corbusiers’s increasingly authoritarian stance and his faith in the ‘‘strong
idea’’ was his decisio´n to dedicate his 1935 work, La ville radieuse, ‘‘To authority’’; Robert
Fishman, Bourgeois Utopias (New York, 1987), pp. 236–237.
93. Ibid., p. 187.
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President in 1934, spoke in confidence to Josep Lluı´s Sert, one of Le
Corbusier’s disciples in Barcelona, of his desire to demolish the Raval
‘‘with cannon-shot’’.94 Yet Le Corbusier needed little encouragement:
following a visit to the Raval during one of his trips to Barcelona, he was
left appalled by the area’s dense and insalubrious housing stock. The
solution, Le Corbusier believed, lay in ‘‘mopping up’’ (esponjament) the
Raval’s streets and replacing them with a series of straight roads and
major thoroughfares.95 In the technocratic utopia, the old city would be
regenerated and the improved flow of goods, services, and people would
bring ‘‘progress’’ and increased industrial power to the whole of
Catalonia. Meanwhile, the former inhabitants of the Raval would be
spirited away from the city centre to occupy modern, Bauhaus-style
multistorey apartment blocks on the margins of Barcelona.
The Macia` Plan remained on the drawing board: it was stymied both by
budgetary problems and by the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in 1936,
after which it became a utopian dream of liberal middle-class planners.96
Commentators normally interpret the Macia` Plan and its radical avant-
garde supporters in the GATCPAC as being inspired by progressive,
democratic, and anti-fascist ideas.97 However, closer analysis reveals that
the Macia` Plan and the GATCPAC obeyed a more traditional discourse
and agenda. The GATCPAC denounced overcrowding in the Raval as a
‘‘cancer’’,98 employing medical language to draw attention to the ‘‘centres
of infection’’ in Chinatown, which, it claimed, was a ‘‘clinical case’’.99
Similarly, the Macia` Plan typified the repressive undercurrent of China-
town discourse. In fact, in its general outlines, the plan pursued cognate
objectives to the Cerda` Plan. Equally, the Macia` Plan resembled the
nineteenth-century Hausmannization of Paris: both were appropriate to
the economic and security requirements of the holders of social, economic,
and political power of the day; both sought to drive major roads through
the narrow, winding streets of working-class districts in order to facilitate
the movement of commodities and, when necessary, the forces of public
order.100 Indeed, the security dimensions of the Macia` Plan are unmistak-
94. Cited in Salvador Tarrago´, ‘‘‘El ‘Pla Macia`’ o ‘La Nova Barcelona’’’, Cuadernos de
Arquitectura y Urbanismo, 90 (1972), p. 29.
95. A. C., June 1937.
96. Jaume Fabre and Josep Maria Huertas, Tots els barris de Barcelona, 7 vols (Barcelona, 1976),
vol. 5, p. 65.
97. See Cristian Cirici, ‘‘Madrid-Barcelona. El nacimiento de dos metropolis modernas’’, in
Xavier Bru de Sala (ed.), Barcelona–Madrid, 1898–1998: sintonı´as y distancias (Barcelona, 1997),
pp. 147–148, Oriol Bohigas, ‘‘Una arquitectura a la Catalunya republicana i auto`nomia’’, in Bru
de Sala, Barcelona–Madrid, pp. 85–93; Josep Maria Rovira, ‘‘Los orı´gines del Plan Macia`: entre
la ciudad radiante y la ciudad funcional’’, in Oyo´n, Vida obrera en la Barcelona de entreguerras,
pp. 263–286.
98. A.C., 25 June 1937.
99. GATCPAC, no. 6, 132.
100. David Harvey, Consciousness and the Urban Experience (Oxford, 1985), pp. 63–220.
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able. It promised the pacification of the Raval through the ‘‘complete
sterilization’’101 of the ‘‘internal enemy’’ resident in the ‘‘district of the
damned [:::] in the heart of the city’’;102 it was an essay in social and spatial
exclusion, a brutal slum-clearance programme designed to destroy the
randomly arranged, winding, narrow streets of the old city labyrinth easier
to map and monitor by the state, while simultaneously forcing its insurgent
population out of the city centre, dispersing it far away from the foci of
economic and political power. In this case, Le Corbusier’s oft-cited plan to
‘‘kill the street’’103 meant expelling a historically rebellious community to
newly designed spaces where it would be more easily contained and policed
by the security forces. Meanwhile, the social networks and local solidarities
that had sustained anti-capitalist resistance in the Raval would be
disrupted.
Yet this was more than an attack on the Raval and its inhabitants: the
planned demolition of the birthplace of the Barcelona working class was an
act of aggression against a local history of proletarian resistance; it signified
the destruction of key historical and symbolic spaces of the Barcelona
working class, the elimination of the sites of memory of the resistance to
capital, of demonstrations, riots, barricades, insurrections, and a whole
array of protest behaviour that had taken place since the 1830s. Spaces of
struggle were to be replaced with major roads, places without history,
around which new solidarities would be impossible. By obliterating these
working-class memory spaces, the collective memory of struggle and
identities contained within those spaces would also fade, and they would
no longer serve as a source of inspiration to future generations of
workers.104
C O N C L U S I O N
Prophecies that ‘‘avenging angels’’ would burst forth from the Raval
proved well-founded during the revolution that accompanied the start of
the Spanish Civil War.105 Consequently, during the Franco dictatorship,
101. L’Opinio´, 16 March 1933; La Publicitat, 16 August 1933.
102. El Esca´ndolo, 13 May and 15 July 1926.
103. Le Corbusier, cited in Marshall Berman, All That Is Solid Melts Into Air: The Experience of
Modernity (London, 1983), p. 168.
104. According to John Berger, these memories are a resource in the class struggle: ‘‘A people or
a class which is cut off from its own past is far less free to choose and to act as a people or class
than one that has been able to situate itself in history’’; Ways of Seeing (Harmondsworth, 1972),
p. 33.
105. See Chris Ealham, ‘‘The Myth of the ‘Maddened Crowd’: Class, Culture and Space in the
Revolutionary Urbanist Project in Barcelona, 1936–7’’, in Chris Ealham and Michael Richards
(eds), The Splintering of Spain: New Historical Perspectives on the Spanish Civil War
(Cambridge, 2005).
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the Raval, like the rest of Barcelona, was singled out for punishment for its
anti-clerical and revolutionary past.106 The elite collective memory of the
spectre of Chinatown and the moral panics endured into post-Francoist
democracy, when, before, during, and after the 1992 Barcelona Olympic
Games, they provided inspiration for a new generation of urban planners
who subjected the Raval’s streets to a vicious process of urban reform and
slum clearance.107 Today, gentrification and property speculation continue
to undermine the Raval’s spaces of working-class memory, forming part of
a programme of social cleansing and middle-class colonization in the
area.108 Yet the protest traditions of the Raval are enduring and the
imposition of urban strategies from above continue to inspire the direct-
action collective resistance by groups rooted in the ‘‘Republic of the
streets’’.109
106. Manuel Va´zquez Montalba´n, Barcelonas (Barcelona, 1990), ch. 5.
107. McNeill, Urban Change and the European Left, pp. 30–36.
108. Melissa Rossi, ‘The Barcelona Model’, Newsweek, 2 April 2004.
109. In late February 2004 local resistance to plans to demolish a bar led to clashes between riot
police and members of the community and patrons and friends of the bar owner; El Perio´dico, 27
February 2004. This protest action, and subsequent ones, were organized by the Coordinadora
contra l’especulacio´ del Raval (Co-ordinating Committee against Speculation in the Raval) and
Arquitectos sin fronteras (Architects without Frontiers).
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